The Munich Security Report 2025 highlights the increasing “multipolarization” of the world, a shift in power towards a larger number of actors and increasing polarization on international and domestic levels. The report focuses on countries considered potential “poles” in an emerging multipolar order, which could be fairer, more just, and peaceful but also reverse progress, fuel inequalities, damage human rights, constrain global problem-solving, and make war more likely.

Multipolarization is evident in the diffusion of material power and the ideological bifurcation between democracies and autocracies. It engenders mixed feelings across the world, with optimistic readings highlighting opportunities for more inclusive global governance and greater constraints on Washington. Pessimistic readings suggest multipolarization increases the risk of disorder and conflict and undermines effective cooperation.

The emerging multipolarity in international relations has been eroded by Donald Trump’s victory, potentially leading to the US abdicating its role as Europe’s security guarantor. China, a prominent proponent of a multipolar order, faces homegrown obstacles and US efforts to hamstring it could intensify under Trump. The EU, embodying the liberal international order, faces challenges due to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the rise of nationalist populism.

Multiploidization describes an ongoing power shift towards a world with more actors vying for influence and captures the international and domestic polarization that comes with increasingly incompatible visions for the international order, making it increasingly difficult for actors to agree on standard solutions to shared global problems.

Unipolarity in the international system remains, with the US accounting for almost 40% of nominal global defense spending, with China being the second-largest spender. Analysts predict a new bipolar era where the US and China are the only superpowers, with everyone else lacking the necessary economic or military capabilities to clear the great-power threshold.

China and the US are currently the most powerful challengers in almost all dimensions, with China trailing the US in nominal GDP and GDP per capita but being the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. China’s military spending is second only to the US’, and it seems to be on track to become its second “nuclear peer.” All other states lack either the economic or military capabilities to join the great-power ranks.

Some scholars argue that the criteria for great-power status are misleading, obscuring the emergence of a multipolar world. A multipolar world does not require several powers with roughly equal capabilities, but significant power is concentrated in more than two states. The G7 and BRICS nations, with the exception of Russia, stand out in several dimensions, with emerging economies accounting for about 40% of global trade and 40% of crude oil production and exports.

Public perception of great powers is shaped by the number of states recognized as great powers, with the US, China, and Russia being the most acknowledged. There is a potential shift towards multipolarity, suggesting a world where multiple nations hold significant influence, though the relevance of historical multipolarity remains uncertain. The trend towards ideological multipolarity indicates a shift in power distribution, with the emerging order possibly marked by ideological unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, or nonpolarity. The liberal moment has become increasingly contested, with the rise of illiberal forces at home and the rise of autocratization. The global divide between democracies and autocracies is increasing, with the “axis of upheaval” – China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia – attracted attention.

The democracy-autocracy dichotomy oversimplifies the marketplace of order models, with countries in the Global South refusing to see the world through the prism of rigid blocs and avoiding taking sides in the growing systemic competition.